Things Netflix taught me about how people buy products

Reading how the coronavirus lockdown has led to a 60% increase of content consumption, the usual culprits were popping (Netflix, Amazon Prime etc).

Of course there was not mention of the free streaming solution: piracy and its enabling technology, BitTorrent.

In 2020, you might think: but of course, it’s illegal. Then again, more than 10% of the UK population has pirated a movie in 2018.

Combine that with the fact that Netflix alone, not to mention any other of the streaming players, has overpowered its free competitor by 2.5X in the UK (Netflix UK subscribers, UK piracy participants) and an interesting question arises.

Netflix: Paid service, allows users to see some movies.
Torrent: Free service, allows users to see any movie that has ever existed. Before Netflix. In good quality.

What did Netflix do so well to have people buying a subscription in swarms?

People don’t buy the price tag, they buy product value 

“FREE” is a very misunderstood pricing tool. FREE can actually be dangerous. Perhaps a good hook you’re selling a commodity amongst commodities. My electricity company can make me switch for a FREE month or so – but then hope I don’t set a reminder to got to the next one and the next one. 

But a FREE month of the newest great email client won’t make me drop my Gmail. If anything, it’s more likely to drop my gmail if I have to pay for email, making me wonder how good can it really be! 

This is also the reason why closely matching the price of a competitor is a good tactic whilst avoiding competition based on price which can erode long-term shareholder value.

For instance, take the streaming wars that have escalated in the past year. Netflix, Hulu, HBO, Disney, Apple, Amazon. 

I am signed up to Netflix and Amazon Prime video. I don’t know how much I pay at this point for Netflix ( premium account, up-sells, multiple devices) and I think* that for Amazon I only pay via my general Amazon Prime subscription i.e. that I have not purchased extra content.

A couple of things: 

  • I have never thought: “Amazon prime comes for FREE. Why am I paying for Netflix?”
  • I also have no idea what the competition (Hulu, HBO, Apple) costs. 

I was not buying a “streaming service for shows”. I was buying Netflix.

And what this meant was that as long as the price didn’t give me the chills, it was not part of the consideration.

Product value is beyond the feature set 

Think of enterprise software. Hubspot. Salesforce. How many features can you recall? 3? 5? there are x,000s. Literally. This only makes sense because on the enterprise level you’re not buying features, you’re buying a solution. 

Do you know exactly how many titles your streaming service offers at any given time? What about movie quality? Is it set at 720p or Blu-Ray? I doubt you do. What about about rich metadata, trailers and extra content? You know why? Because that is not what was important.

In consumer, and I would argue in SMB SaaS, no one buys a product as a result of a deliberate comparative analysis.

This is something business schools got really wrong. “Benchmarking” on features is wrong. 

It assumes that people make purchasing decisions following an analytical, logical approach in a sterile, static environment. Which is not the case.

People buy product value and that is inseparable from the context the user buys a service. Timing is context. The political environment is context. What their friend bought is context. 

Positioning is Product value 

Social representations and connotations that come with the product are also part of the context. 

People don’t sign up to Netflix because it has more movies or it’s faster than Amazon Prime video. They do because there’s became inextricably related to cultural standards of millennial audiences. We think of unwinding and we think of Netflix. We think of cool shows and we think of Netflix (original content). We even think of dating in relation to Netflix aka “Netflix and Chill”.

People buy product value and that is related to the brand, the context, the features, the price and every other connotation linking the company entity to our entire social fabric.

And engagement.. which is very much a habit. 

And there’s a final element which follows but also solidifies all the previous. Habits. It’s what keeps a user from switching. To be clear I am talking about dopamine inducing, visually stimulating, thoughtfully designed.. habits. The ones you just can’t help but do all the time.

For a long time I have been getting surprised how streaming services became such a huge industry when there’s piracy: an obvious, free, relatively low risk alternative. 

The argument is strong: If you were told that you can go to the movies and watch a movie for free, or you can pay, it’s reasonable to assume you’d take the FREE version. 

And so, for a very long time I was thinking the same analogy applies to streaming services vs piracy: Why would people a) wait way longer b) for something to maybe arrive on their streaming service c) only for then to have to pay to watch it? 

And it turns out the answer is very simple: 

  • Because Netflix did a great marketing job to create a solid brand (positioning)
  • and later because people don’t want to think – Netflix became a habit i.e. no cognitive tax for the action.

Piracy has two main disadvantages.

  • It relies on one form of peer to peer sharing or another – therefore it’s prone to lagging while streaming or requires upfront time to download. 
  • It requires a set up to transfer the movie from a computer to another device e.g. a Home cinema station.

In other words, you need to think 10’ minutes in advance to download the show (Any show you can think of!) and you need to port it on your TV either with cable, Bluetooth, usb. 

Yet the numbers are telling; people prefer to open their media streaming kit on their Smart TV (e.g. Fire TV, Apple TV etc), compromise on what movie they’re going to watch AND pay (if it’s a paid one on Amazon prime) to watch it. From an economic stand point it’s interesting because initially it looks that the rational agent theory goes out of the window. But I think it’s simply a matter of what “rational” means and what is the currency we are trading.

People are using their emotional, short-term reward seeking, hacky side, what Thinking Fast and Slow baptized “System 1”. We don’t want to think. We want rewards to be quick. We want no inconsistencies and disruptions. Under that light, it’s obvious why people will choose Netflix again and again. No bugs, no lags and above all, it’s convenient. No Extra work.

So there’s a few reason altogether that lead Netflix to be easier to find out about, sign up and keep using.

First, people by definition are deterred from being vocal about their online piracy related excursions. On the contrary, people are very vocal about what they watch on Netflix:

It’s easy, safe and “common” to subscribe.

Strong recommendations and autoplay like features activate users immediately and teach that you can get a reward (watch a nice movie) without lifting a finger.

And so even if the movie is not on Netflix, it might be the case that money-wise paying Amazon for the movie you’re searching costs £2.99 ( random number) but carries the cognitive cost of 1 thing to think or, in technical terms, 1 Elementary information process: choosing a movie.

Measured in terms of EIPs BitTorrent is much more expensive: 

  • Select the movie. 
  • Find the right torrent to download. 
  • Turn a VPN on (ideally if you don’t want to be tracked) 
  • Port the movie in a usb / find and connect a cable. 
  • Sync subs if necessary
  • Play from the computer and standup to pause OR add an app to control your PC from your phone 

This is 6 EIPs and TIME associated. 

So it turns out that it’s not FREE. It is costing you time and effort. 

So choosing the movie from Amazon video comes at a lower cost altogether. 

And sticking to it? Well, that’s easy right? You choose the movie, click play and 99% of the times you simply have a great experience with metadata, subs synced and the movie in HD quality. 

But here’s the most interesting thing streaming services and the king of the hill, Netflix act like they know all too well: People get used to the cue, not even the reward itself. 

In other words? Even when the pirated movie comes conveniently at the ease of one click within your streaming service (see Cinema V2, popcorntime for Amazon video) we are still more likely to click the Netflix thumbnail and spend our time looking for a movie there first. Why? Seeing Netflix’s thumbnail is already flooding our brain with chemicals, as if the reward that comes after having watched an enjoyable movie, has already occurred. 

And thus, even though we have a free alternative we are “hooked” on clicking on the paid version. 

Build value and they will buy it

This logic applies to other costs. Sharing data. Spending time.

So next time your company or investment is up against fierce feature, price or marketing budget competition, ask yourself: How are they delivering value beyond features and price?

The obstacle is the way. But why?

Is the obstacle the way? Why is struggle so important after all? I always agreed intuitively but recently thought about it a bit further.

The first premise lies in the recognition that Truth is the ultimate value. And to acknowledge any truth you need to become aware of it first. And this is where pain and struggle are invaluable. Because pain is not something you can neglect. You have to face it, accept its truth and with it, your limits.

Acceptance allows for mental closure and rest irrespective of the result, or further action. You now know.

And isn’t this acceptance, the prerequisite for equanimity?

Perhaps this is where the answer starts to become more clear.

For to find truths that lead to acceptance, you need to get uncomfortable, relieve yourself of the fear and prejudice that casually cloud the judgment and let go in uncertainty, in the struggle.

It’s in those moments that nuggets of truth are discovered as you see what you’re made of. To your liking or not, it is the truth.

And if you’re aiming at truth and equanimity this only comes from challenge. From obstacles.

And so, the obstacle is the way. The way to the truth, the way to equanimity.

Lessons from unconventional fundraising.

By the time I got to my first venture, I was clear that the path to money was going to be hard. A soul-grinding, mind numbing, frustrating experience. I did believe however that it would be straightforward.

I thought: “There’s a doctrine. You study it, and you’re good”. It goes something like this: First make a 10-15 page deck engineered to attract enough positive attention to get you a meeting. Take the meeting. Show you’re good at business development. You get basic finance. You know how to market. You follow the rules, you tell a great story, you’re full of morsels of market wisdom. You get funded. Right?

This method works – it’s not just folklore – but it didn’t work for me initially. I was lacking the network, the numbers, the experience. And oh, God, did I try in the beginning. 

Early on though, I realized a few of things.

First, if I have to do this thing for months at a time I need to do it in a way that I feel alright during the process. 

Secondly, history is written by the victors. In this game, no matter what you do, no matter what your personal goals and values are, it’s the result that will deem you successful or not for the world. So follow the path that works, not the one that comes recommended. 

Last but not least, always be forthcoming with facts, tell the truth. It saves a lot of time and helps discern the “yeses” faster. As with most other things in life, fundraising is a numbers game.

Digging in. 

When fundraising, make sure you feel good. 

When undertaking a tough and lengthy task, it’s crucial to feel good. Now, there’s a difference between feeling good and feeling comfortable. Uncomfortable is good. Keeps you on your toes. Keeps you sharp. But there’s also a difference between feeling uncomfortable and exposed. “Exposed” is the state when your actions and your beliefs are in dissonance. Exposed also equals “stressed” and stressed is counterproductive. Anything that spikes your cortisol above acceptable limits should be banned. You’re an exec fundraising, the last thing anyone wants to sense is fear. Maintaining composure is imperative. And if a relaxed countenance is not achievable certainly abstain from stress inducing situations, set ups and choices.

For instance, don’t “prettify truths”. Don’t try to extort intros. Don’t front. Irrespective of impact, abstain from anxiety feeding behaviour.

Generally, no matter what advice you receive, make sure you feel good with your actions. Alignment of actions and beliefs is crucial for consistent performance.  

Following what works, not what’s prescribed

The first time I raised money, I raised ~£200k. Of that, ~60% came from people I had no previous connection to. No intros. No common friends. No school classmates. 

Would I have done it again? 100%. Was it my first choice or recommendation? Certainly not. But I didn’t have the option. So it was decided. I was going to get complete strangers to close my first.  

In contrast, here’s the traditional wisdom: 

Find founders and/or people that can intro you to others. Take coffee meetings. Be nice. Help them. Then eventually ask for an intro to investors. Blah Blah. 

And I did that as much as possible. There’s merit to this approach. But in my case, burning money like crazy, coming off a corporate spin off and having two months of runway at the time was not providing the stable footing required for building this kind of long winded relationships. Also, how many coffees can one drink per day really? 

More importantly, I didn’t have a large enough network in investment, and my friends’ intros were either not enough or would not pan out in the desired timeframe.

What I did have was a fundamental belief that we are a good team. Resilient and adaptable. We were worth the bet.

If I spoke to enough people, a few would share my belief and we’d bank the needed cash till we can form a more concrete view of the business.

If you have a good idea, try it

So I decided to proceed in an untraditional approach to fundraising. I went cold. First, I spent a day stitching together data from AngeList, LinkedIn and other networks. That provided me with a list of professional investors. To get started and test my approach I qualified leads (investors) based on really rudimentary parameters i.e. stages invested, number of investments, connection degree. Finally, I blasted every single investor that passed my lead qualification stage. I think I ended up with something like 2.000 leads in my first list. 

To diminish manual work, a bot was tasked with connecting and initiating conversations with people on LinkedIn. I would pick up conversations once signs of engagement were present. It was a very elaborate scheme, one that got complex as I was moving on, and probably deserves its own post but let’s just say that it working really well.  

It only took a few days and I was suddenly connected to 100s of angels, VCs, family offices. Eventually this process became more targeted but initially I didn’t care. I just went on a whim. Experimented.

The result is that I pitched around 40 people I have had no previous connection to and closed the money I needed. More than money, I formed meaningful connections with individuals I respect and have kept in my close network. Oh and definitely, opened up doors that previously were closed.

Were mistakes made? Obviously. Does it matter? Not really. Did the funding close? Yes. Did we ‘win’ against all odds? Yes. 

If something seems like a good idea, try it. People advising to the counter should serve as a caution, not a mandate to follow. Do what works for you. 

Pitch like you’d pitch your friend’s friend. 

Everytime I write an email to a new connection, investor, partner or client I imagine that I’m talking to a person I like but I am not familiar with.

I aim to write with friendly tone, get straight to the point, raise my request yet not in a pushy way. Above all, maintain transparency. 

During fundraising founders often seek advice and feedback on their decks, business etc. Feedback will rarely be music to your ears. For some, this can be overwhelming and try to conceal or prettify their weak points.

Acceptable? Maybe. Factual? Yes. However, is this how you’d communicate your business to a friend’s friend? Perhaps not obvious at first, this is counterproductive, leads to time waste and misunderstandings.

What do you do instead? You lead with weakness. You tell the truth. The truth does not need to be bent to be attractive. Nor am I suggesting of course regurgitating the problems of the business as a conversation starter. It is narrative that presents an opportune moment. Example:

  • We have found problem X for person Z.
  • We have solution Y. We believe the solution is superior because of abc, the timing is great and the market is sizeable and up for grabs. 
  • Now is the time to act and solve 1,2,3 issues (weakness) that stop us from a homerun.
  • Want to work together on this? 

Also remember, a marriage. Your relationship with each investor might span the duration of the company’s remaining life. You don’t marry on first date. You wanna see the ugly side first. So do that, present your weakness. Don’t lie; stay true to your narrative. Explain why these issues are not insurmountable. If you get a call for a second or third meeting (sometimes you need to wait a bit, feel the environment, it’s not always good to rush) you’re on a good path. Else, you’ve saved a lot of time. 

This is perhaps the most important lesson I have picked up along the way. Here’s another way of looking at it.

Version A: pitching life at the prairie where everything is rosy. 

First call/meeting: 100 people. 

Second call/meeting: 80 people. 

Follow-up: 60 people.

(due diligence or consideration)

Term sheet: 0-2.

And consider the cost of relationship management at those numbers. Juggling 60 names and email threads at time compounds. This is why most people say fundraising is a full time job. 

Now, version B: The 8-mile-final-battle approach. Say it as it is but with style.

First call: 100 people. 

Second call: 50 people. 

Follow up: 20 people.

(due diligence or consideration)

Term sheet: 0-10 People. 

I have done both. The latter works so much better.

Meanwhile the team won’t miss a founder because fundraising takes 40% of your time leaving 60% for working on the product/business instead of giving 10% to the job (barely catching up with what’s going on, no input) and 90% discussing with investors in vain. 

To conclude…

Fundraising sucks.  And as much as I try to reframe the process, think of it as a terrain to practice on self control, patience etc, really, it’s a grind.

So do it in the way that works for you. Conventional wisdom is good, but business is a game, the most complex of them all. Crafting your own path might mean the difference between reaching your destination or not. 

Random connections today, friends tomorrow. A note on cold messaging.

Throughout my life, connections with strangers have consistently shaped what was about to come. Originally social acquaintances, later friends and recently business partners and investors.

Connecting to strangers via the internet is great. It transcends inherent network limitations. It creates a much needed sense of serendipity. It allows for business, cultural and intellectual leaps. And on a practical note, in an era of increasing automation, connecting directly, human to human can be very rewarding.

That said, most people don’t do it. It is not the norm and initially feels uncomfortable. So much so, that everyone spends hours thinking what to write, how to avoid coming across as invasive, persistent, misunderstood. There is also good reason behind that. We are not used to receiving highly relevant and/or rewarding communication from strangers. More often than not we have annoying, spammy, automated campaigns top of mind when we think of messages from strangers. And somewhere between the inherent anxiety (“what will they think?!”) and needing to get a message across, the “Send” button gets eventually pressed.

When you want something, thinking how to frame your message is inevitable. And given that on the other side there’s stranger and you have no in, it’s even harder.

So, how do you go about reaching out to the world without spending an hour at at a time pondering on the perceived nuances of each word and ruminating on all possible responses?

To that, here are some points that I found useful:

  1. Most of the time, the world does not care. 
    This is important to remember. There’s a high likelihood that a cold message won’t get a response (the first, second, third time..). This happens less so because of the contents of the message and more due to people being busy. As a stranger, you’re another message in one’s inbox. It’s not good, it’s not bad, it’s just a fact. And so because people don’t care, they also forget quickly. So, feel free to say what you want, most of the time there’s no downside.
  2. Write like you’re addressing a friendly acquaintance (you don’t know well). 
    This has been the most efficient framework for me. I have this ‘friend’ I always think about when I get stuck. To be precise I have met her about of 4-5 times in my life. She’s a friendly acquaintance. Someone I enjoy speaking to, can express my opinion, would happily spend time with should the occasion arise, but also one whose call I find rather unlikely to receive. In other words, a person that I’d feel comfortable when writing to but in the same time I don’t know very well. That’s how I aim to write every message. If I get stuck, I substitute the recipient with her in mind. Helps me be friendly, positive and above all, genuine. As a result, no energy is spent pondering on future, hypothetical outcomes. It’s her! She’s great. And I like her. 
  3. Be genuine with the rest of your actions. 
    By the way, this helps me follow up without guilt. Would I not follow up with my friend? A positive mindset and friendly attitude means that people around you might be so too. But even if that’s not the case your attitude ensures you won’t get defensive. Would you get defensive with a friend? (Hopefully) No.

Finally, even if you don’t get a response, keep on engaging. Someone has been politely emailing me for a long time. I kept failing to respond until recently they posted something on LinkedIn that I found interesting. By now, I feel as if I know them and as we are connected on LinkedIn I commented. Guess who’s top of mind next time I think about the type of service he’s offering. Counterintuitive perhaps. But it’s also true. The more we see of someone, the more familiar they become to us. Call it personal brand awareness.

The gist is this: Connecting to strangers is beautiful, powerful and might even change your life. Sometimes random connections turn to meaningful relationships. And being genuine, friendly and direct makes it all that easier. No reason to be cold to a (future) friend.

Why is there no dominant marketplace in therapy yet?

Lately there’s a business fascination with Mental Health. The majority of people who want to get involved with mental health and specifically therapy, think that it is about to break out; become the next gym; the next yoga; and every time we talk about that, it never happens.

While there is a lot of room for innovation on the client side, the current landscape does not accommodate the needs of the most important player: the therapist. And that seems to be overlooked. What is it that therapists really want after all?

The therapist journey

Therapists, like every other professional, go through their own journey of professional maturity. Besides honing their therapy related skills they also have to deal with figuring out how to run a business. And whilst therapy might be quite an esoteric profession, like any other business, there’s a traditional path in the life of a therapist. So, what does a therapist trajectory look like from a business point of view? 

  1. First, a therapist needs to find their first clients.
  2. Once the first few clients are there, the need for operationalization kicks in: Find clients who are a good fit, deal with practice admin and start building a brand.
  3. Once that’s done now it’s time to optimize. Process and revenue improvement.
  4. If they get above all three, then the therapists start thinking about consulting, writing books, opening up a clinic or of course stay happy with a full practice.

And it is very important to see the industry through this lens because these are the use cases that have shaped the industry. 

As you can imagine, the first big players were formed to tackle what was top of mind for therapists in the beginning: getting clients. 

And so the first successful business model that was born was “directories”.

Directories aka traffic uber-alles

From a business perspective these companies were the first matchmakers and put therapists who didn’t have the resources to create a personal website on the map and are currently thriving due to a mixture of things: domain authority, brand, dominance in search, network effects, and as discussed later, the inability of platforms to innovate effectively. These platforms work as marketing services providing referrals and auxiliary marketing services such as profile statistics and other branding opportunities such as content publishing (which works in a self serving way for the platform). 

For that, therapists pay a base subscription which essentially lists a profile but does not guarantee any traffic to it; following the typical classified model of the 2000’s, therapists can upgrade to get additional traffic. 

However, the economics underpinning this subscription model are flawed for a few reasons.

The first and foremost being that incentives between the directory and the therapist are misaligned and consequently lead to negative aggregate marginal benefit. 

What does this mean?

The no.1 priority of the directories is to list more therapists given that this is how they make money. Their no.2 priority is to up-sell said therapists. Everything else is an add-on and that is evident simply from the fact that there has been no attempt towards innovation whatsoever beyond the first two.

And here is why incentive misalignment is bound to create inequality and therefore a negative sum game.

First, the existing premises of the game. Directories in the UK have xx,000 of therapists subscribed. Therapists see that and of course this is attractive. If it was not working, why are so many others paying for it? It’s social proof. So here is what happens.

Step 1. Action: A therapist lists their profile and start paying.
Step 1. Result: Competing for views with more than 1.000 other therapists in any given area, there is a high chance that the therapist won’t receive a client. This happens for two reasons: the directory cannot ensure demand increases proportionally with supply and don’t collect enough data to tailor search results for each user (matching).

Step 2. Action: The therapist now decides to upgrade (50% extra cost) their subscription.
Step 2: Result: Now the therapist ranks highly in the location search and therefore starts getting clients, disproportionately to the price increase they have paid. They’re happy and decide to stick. 

At this point it’s important to note a couple of things: 

  • Users searching therapy result sets act similarly to as if they’re searching on Google. The implications is that the top 10 results get 99% of the clicks.
  • There are more therapists in each given area than top positions.

Result? For every therapist that pays a premium listing, another therapist loses. 

Predictably, there is a clear threshold for when the curve of value / fee starts declining. And that is the time when more than 10 therapists are paying a premium listing to appear in a given area. Then they are all collectively eroding their ROI. At least one will not benefit by not being in the top ten even though they’re paying extra.

But this realisation has a lagging effect. By the time people are realizing their listing performance is going down, we don’t have 11 contenders, we have more like 30.

Result? Initially they stall, but eventually they churn from being up sold.

What you might be thinking is: But aren’t the clients using the network increasing? Why is there a problem?

This is a good question and traditional logic has it that the more therapists on one platform the more demand comes. But then again: 

  • The site itself does not have as a priority to market to clients; rather it has its eyes on more therapists. Additionally, since these organizations started as marketing organizations, it’s not in their core skillset to be thinking of market equilibria and distribution optimization (liquidity). It’s in their mind to sign and upsell.
  • The no.1 obvious marketing benefit resulting from more therapists in an existing network is that of unique content and thus, organic traffic. But again, not the case for a couple of reasons:
    • Legacy platforms are already receiving most of their traffic from SEO/ organic search which indicates that a new therapist’s profile listing is not going to provide a novel and previously lacking answer to a user’s search engine query (imagine that queries on google are “therapist in London”).
    • Therapists profiles are actually duplicate content! Because no one platform can guarantee an influx of clients, therapists end up being on multiple platforms all of which are trying to do the same. Thus, they copy paste their profile pages and the case for unique content becomes null.

So we conclude that subscriptions to provide marketing facilities is not an optimal model to create, deliver and capture the value of the therapy industry. To summarize:

  • Your happy clients don’t pay more then your unhappy necessarily,
  • value in upsells goes down the more participants in the network get sold and acquisition of new clients is organic (search)
  • but there is no lock-down which leads to churn.

But what if we could go deeper, provide more services that better the recurrent relationship between the therapist and the client which is likely to reach >£1,000 in several cases? 

Marketplace 2.0, the serviced marketplace. 

Psychotherapy as an industry, and especially through the lens of a marketplace model looks very attractive at first sight for a few reasons: 

  • There is a lot of talk about it: government, mainstream media and social media create the expectation of continuous growth in demand.
  • The service itself is costly (average price of therapy according to our own data is £58 in the UK) and there is a decent market size (~£3bn).
  • At least 89% of therapists operate at least partly under a private practice which means there is a lot of fragmentation in the market. 

And the space has become interesting to tech entrepreneurs who understand how to build marketplaces. The story goes something like this: Aggregate the therapists (supply) under a full stack service proposition, charge fees that persist for the duration of the therapeutic relationship and reinvest said fees to get more clients in and keep the loop going. By providing a better service and a performance model (i.e. no subscription costs) these services lower the barrier to sign up. More traffic, better experience, lower CAC. This is marketplace 2.0 approach, or “let’s make the Uber of therapy”.

“We will give you clients, booking facilities, online payments and all that for ~10% each time. How does that sound?” 

Initially it sounds great to the marketplace and good to the therapist. But then issues arise. A deeper look reveals the inflection point: incentive misalignment.

Incentive misalignment

Therapist needs

Initially it might not be clear. Therapists are cryptic and don’t like working with people that “sell” them. Once one peels through the many layers of the conversation and assuming manage to separate business from therapy (not easy at all), what therapists really want is pretty simple:

  • First, they want a steady stream of clients. Depending on whether they’re running a full practice or not that number might be higher or lower but the value is the same. They don’t want to have to stay in the mode of survival.
  • Secondly they want the platforms to stay out of their business and let them manage the relationship with the client whom they view as their own client.
  • Third they want additional services to help them manage their practice efficiently but in a way that does not cost an arm and a leg and serves their existing workflow.

Platform incentives

Platforms on the other hand, have different incentives. Specifically:

  • Platforms need to control the relationship between client <> therapist because otherwise disintermediation becomes a real issue.
  • Platforms are incentivized to provide more tools and services to therapists so as to control the relationship and justify their recurrent margins. However standardizing the experience is imperative to build a model around costs and revenues. In other words, there are rules every therapist must adhere to. Platforms can’t create different user journeys for each therapist nor operate under an open architecture where therapists can plug in their tools because a) that’s not convenient to start with before you have serious cash coming in and b) it invalidates the case for control of the relationship.
  • And what is the control point of it all? The Calendar. Why? Because by having access to read & write in a therapist’s calendar massively increases client conversion rate and reduces CAC. So every marketplace app is vying for the ability to have access to read and write on a therapist’s calendar.

The deadlock

The problem boils down to something very simple. Platforms base their business on two premises: First, that broader servicing of therapists will result in higher Lifetime Value per therapist and secondly that returns increase drastically when the market gets effectively monopolized. Therapy in the UK however is worth £3bn so not that big of a market. Therefore the whole “when we get too big, winner takes all” pitch does not sit very well given the risk reward ratio and absolute magnitude of the two. And that implies that reliance to institutional money with negative unit economics is not an option.

So platforms *need* healthy economics from day one. Any friction between the client booking the therapist needs to be eliminated. Given the newly established paradigm of on-demand services where online booking & checking out happens seamlessly, clients come with increased expectations of therapy platforms. And thus, the lack of visibility into a therapist’s availability is up there in the product problems worth fighting for. Otherwise unit economics are unsustainable**. Result? Cash flow deficit and diminished interest of additional investment. Frictionless experience end-to-end is crucial and the ability to add bookings directly to the calendar key.

On the other hand, the only therapists willing to give (up) their calendar to be managed by a platform are those who don’t have enough clients and once they do, they’d stop updating their availability. Why? There are a couple of good reasons for that.

  • First, therapists want to see clients they can actually help. The fact that a client wants to book a therapist does not mean that’s the right choice for them. Therapists feel they have to do the triaging (and they don’t trust an automated alternative) and should they deem a client a bad fit they would find themselves in the difficult position of having to cancel the appointment the platform booked and disappoint the client.
  • Secondly, this process requires a lot of work from therapists. Every time they get a booking from one service, then invariably they’d need to update their availability in every other platform and that is quite cumbersome. Also, what if their schedule changes? Why would they need to report to anyone?

And so we have the calendar deadlock. Therapists want freedom and no more admin and platforms don’t have enough clients to impose terms.

But the deadlock extends on another dimension which is crucial to answer the titular question: That of competition between the incumbent(directories) and the new entrants (marketplaces).

Without the calendar, marketplaces can’t provide their seamless experience to customers nor service the therapists as they like. And by not doing so, there is no differentiation. They provide a subpar experience, become “yet another directory” and compete in a commoditized game they can’t win (referrals, seo, paid ads).

But if they push for the calendar they lose their therapists as there’s no supplier power and thus, can’t scale. And of course the more platforms created, the more the calendar is requested and the more the problem is exacerbated. For every new platform created the worse the unit economics for every other platform in the short term.

And so there you have it. Therapy in the consumer space remains locked between a model that is inefficient both in terms of economics and user experience and another that does not provide a good UX for the therapists.

And in this industry without the therapists, you can’t craft a great UX for the customer either.

A vicious cycle really.


*We have interviewed therapists that mentioned they hadn’t received a client from directories for over 18 months whilst paying of course. 

** We have seen up to 200% higher CAC from paid ads when a therapist does not provide their calendar.

eBay’s loss was not against Amazon; it was against itself and Shopify is the winner

Yesterday, I stumbled on an FT article detailing Shopify’s growth to more than 800,000 merchants and $40bn market cap. The article caught my eye and made me think, for a couple of reasons. To begin with, it refers to Shopify’s market capitalization in comparison to eBay, which prompts the interesting question:”what’s the relationship between the two?”. In addition, it hints at Amazon as the next target, as if the three were ever in the same race – not true -. Following that thread, the everlasting eBay – Amazon relationship deserves some clarifying comments. Also, it is worth seeing how Shopify carved its own path in the ecommerce space, a path that eBay with its $10.8bn in revenue and great positioning should have owned; but it didn’t.

Most people think that eBay’s a dud stock because it never managed to capitalize on the ecommerce revolution that Amazon brought about, but I would argue that is not the case and the two should not be compared. EBay is a dud stock because it didn’t capitalize on the discovery driven ecommerce, which itself started, when the trend expanded beyond its platform and onto social media. This is where Shopify thrived. But first, why do I say that eBay should not be compared with Amazon?

Simply because the two companies share vastly different business models. The way they create and deliver value is quite different. Which is also the case in the way they capture value, even though at first sight they might look similar (both sell products and take % from the sales).

However the difference in the experience the two companies aimed to provide was crisp, from the beginning (2006 amazon launches FBA, Prime) at least before Amazon doubled-down on 3rd Party Sellers. But first, looking at buyers here’s how the two positioned themselves:

Amazon: “The everything store”

eBay: “The bargain store”

Amazon : “Buy new stuff” 

eBay: “Buy at auctions” 

Amazon: “Buy commodities”

eBay: “Buy collectibles.”

Already this should be enough to showcase the stark difference in mindset, target audience of buyers and their purchasing habits.

To add to that, take a look at eBay’s mission statement: “At eBay, our mission is to provide a global online marketplace where practically anyone can trade practically anything, enabling economic opportunity around the world.”

I think the most important part in the above statement is the bit on economic opportunity. Originally, everything about eBay was around “opportunity”. The sellers that took eBay public at 1998 and brought more than $47mn in revenue and 724% increase that year came did all that via auctions. The company was already valued at >$1bn. There was still a lot of room for growth and it was already snowballing.

eBay was offering economic opportunity to buyers and sellers. It rode the wave of the transactional web (web 1.0) and absolutely dominated that space. By the time I started working at eBay, 15 years later (2014), eBay’s impact had grown so much that I personally knew of families who had bought their primary residence in London merely from trading on eBay.

And so eBay went on to make this opportunistic flea-market experience as seamless and emotionally safe as possible doing what any sane corporation would do; alleviate any issues from a business model and experience that worked really well. They started their feedback program, bought PayPal and launched eBay money back guarantee amongst other things.

For a business whose whole experience is discovery, surprise and the hunt itself, everything that comes with a traditional retail experience is secondary. Shipping, authenticity guarantees, lack of inventory standardization were all nuisances one had to live with. The user purpose was one: Discover and grab yourself a bargain.

Amazon was quite different. Amazon wanted to have and store “one of everything” making it the everything store. And Jeff Bezos was very outspoken about customer experience being the salient reason of the success to come. Amazon would not be the place to find something rare or vintage nor would it be the place to haggle. Amazon would be the place to buy everything that can be sold at a great price, in a few clicks, shipped at the greatest convenience. Till this day, when you go on Amazon, you know what you are about to buy or at least what need you’re trying to fulfil. Amazon was offering utility and delight built incrementally through consistency. Its business model initially was not very sustainable nor was it protected by network effects between buyers and sellers. Its strength was derived by careful alignment of internally owned, building blocks stacked one on top of another.

In hindsight, from 2005 onwards it was obvious that the two companies were nothing alike. Amazon launched Prime, FBA (fulfilment by Amazon) and invested in integrating services to perfect the art of the trade (literally) while eBay was focused on semi-congruent land grab strategy and acted more like a traditional business following a management consulting playbook. Acquisition of classifieds and marketplaces in other verticals (e.g. StubHub in ticketing) were a clear indication of what eBay was doing. It was hedging and whilst doing so, with a semi-conscious guilt, growing apart from helping its original sellers, the opportunists & the mom’n’pop shops. New fees, new regulations, more standardization around process and a push for onboarding bigger merchants sidelined the original batch of sellers. I didn’t see the NPS scores (which eBay invented) but I remember a general disappointment from sellers. And it was not just a feeling. It was in external forums, in eBay’s Seller hub (eBay content pages for sellers) and in water cooler chats between employees. And that was about to be reflected in the stock.

Around 2014, when I accepted my first job ever at eBay as a Product Management Intern under the European Product Development group eBay was still a single entity with PayPal. By the end of 2014, eBay had decided to split with PayPal and price per share had flatlined, trading at $21.01, or $0.02 cents less than 2013 despite eBay’s total assets still experiencing healthy growth. What was happening? The company was transitioning from its original model which while a perfect fit with customers, now exhausted, to a new one driven not by customer delight but by business case and speculation. eBay had grown to a big corporation and was acting like one.

Analysts had figured that out and as Amazon was completely dominating the eCommerce space, eBay was looking like a company that had no exciting plans to grow.

I remember during my first days being very surprised that the words “auction” within the London HQ being almost taboo. I was struck by that; not from a business sense but from a cultural sense. Rather than turning a page, the company was abruptly rejecting its own legacy all the while not being able to completely escape from its shadow (auction is running successfully till this day of course). This was the greatest issue that plagued eBay. A bumpy culture shift that never really stuck and the community driven entrepreneurial instincts that were abandoned.

Here is how eBay worked in 2014. John Donahoe, CEO at the time, came from a management consulting background. And that was apparent. All announcements and decisions across the chain were communicated based on market opportunity. Product management was essentially product development and user centricity was inexistent. The problem was that the transition from iconic, community based internet company to corporation-pleasing-shareholders was never deeply realized. There was an ebb and flow of power, priorities and the whole company was not clear as to what was its identity, its values and how the disparate entities should operate together as a business. Strategy was nowhere near “customer-driven” and that was the non-addressed elephant in the room*.

The business “owners”, wanted first to rip out of eBay any connotation to its flea-market identity. Then using existing assets target SMBs and, at the same time large retailers to sell via eBay. This would transform eBay from an aggregator of individual sellers relying on community and word-of-mouth to grow to a series of Shops operating within the platform using the existing technology and tools, relying on corporate relationships to grow. The thinking was simple: Who can we sell our existing audience and platform to next? But the reality was that there was no coherence, no proof this was the right thing to do, nor that the new customer base wanted to sell via eBay. While it is not unlike companies to shift in their proposition in pursuit of growth, eBay was simply eroding it.

In conversations around strategy and next steps with senior executives, I remember hearing of retailer with iconic names like “Selfridges”, “House of Fraser” as targets for the eBay Large Merchant programme. Such was the pressure from the business that the self-evident brand conflict was not bothering anyone. Employees were simply executing. A few colleagues of mine from the product teams were working on individual integrations with large merchants striving to prove the new viable growth strategy for eBay. None of it happened. Months of product development was canned. The very talented individuals started fleeing eBay’s European Product teams. EBay was both confused and out of character and I am afraid, still is.

Meanwhile, Shopify was serving the customer.

Meanwhile, in 2014 and with 80,000 Sellers in its books Shopify was building the right infrastructure and positioning itself perfectly to serve a new generation of ambitious sellers.

“There was no ‘powered by Shopify’ anywhere, we built a brand behind other people’s brands.”

Tobi Lütke

Already operating for 10 years and with a clear problem he faced himself, Tobi Lütke was growing Shopify according to what the market needed. Social media had already massively changed the way people bought from the internet by 2014 and ecommerce had developed a lot. Selling online could happen in different ways and non-traditional business models, including dropshipping, were gaining popularity online as the shopping became more and more linked to an “experience”.

Shopify covered all the requirements for this new breed of merchants. Businesses could focus on their brand, marketing presence and strategy while Shopify would allow them to build the e-shop of their dreams. Designed to their taste, and with pretty much everything taken care of. From some point onwards, this included shipping, making it a viable option to escape selling via Amazon.

Shopify was merely focused on pleasing its users with whom the founding team identified with. Its aim was to give small merchants the tools they needed to sell online without enforcing complicated policies, pricing or its own brand.

And that is exactly where eBay lost the battle. EBay had all the assets, capabilities and understanding of the market to pursue this strategy. The core platform could perform the marketing and transactional part of the job raking in revenues for sales. Meanwhile, instead of enforcing eBay Shops, it could outsource all of its tools to individual merchants. Having sellers run their (non-eBay) shops on the web, on their own would unlock new revenue streams, allow for higher profit margins (no owned customer support) and differentiate eBay’s positioning in the eCommerce value chain.

Not only did eBay have the technology but it also held the distribution. Had eBay proceeded to lend its core platform with lower fees to its 25 million sellers outside of eBay, it could have rode the wave of social shopping and the Pinterest – Instagram discovery led buying, making it highly relevant to a new generation of buyers as a platform. And by doing so, besides managing to reap the benefits of the social media wave which it never did, it would also have started to penetrate Amazon’s tight value chain (Shopify sellers can sell via Amazon).

The big brand and the rigidity that comes with owning the core marketplace meant EBay’s executive team was not even remotely ready to consider any new models that would jeopardize its existing position for a better outcome. No one wanted to rock the boat. The revenue numbers were/are still growing in the core business. Even when eBay bought Milo, a local shopping startup which was allowing retailers to catalogue their inventory, eBay’s idea was to onboard these sellers online. Selling outside of the eBay platform was never an option.

Shopify on the other hand, allowing full customization saw its sellers thriving and kept on assisting them with tools. As a result it grew from 40,000 stores in 2012 to more than 800,000 today.

It was corporate conservatism and the loss of vision that cost eBay its growth, not competence. EBay didn’t lose against Amazon. It lost against itself and Shopify is the winner.


*I guess that was acknowledged and it culminated in the hiring of a new CPO and VP of design, both from Apple.

** Any views expressed on this post are my own and do not represent the opinions of any entity whatsoever with which I have been, am now, or will be affiliated.

Software engineering..or how to be precise in your speech.

I had just signed up to a course called “Software engineering”. I am not going to lie. I had heard the course was a walk in the park and given that that semester I was about to overexert myself with some tough modules, I decided I would take this one to balance it out. Hey, I didn’t want to be a software engineer!

However, software engineering laid the basis for a thought process defined by diligence. It might be the single most useful class I took. Software engineering was building on First Order Logic to formally specify a programme. Describing a system formally was without question the most pedantic, boring and useful thing I have learnt. See, Computer science, is a “made up” science. It’s based on (boolean) math so all good and well here but, unlike physics, it’s not bound by the laws of nature. Everything goes. So when you need to define a system you have to explain the tiniest assumptions you’re making.

Take this simple example from the actual class:

Phrase: Italians only read Topolino.

Formula: ∀b:books, ∀p:people. [(italian(p)∧read(p,b)) → b=topolino]

The phrase sounds simple but the Formula, which says the same things, adds details that seem obvious to the human mind but not at all to a database or a compiler. So to be more friendly to a computer, it reads something like this: “For every b, where b belongs in the set “books”, and for every p, where p belongs in the set “people”, if p is Italian AND p is reading a b, then b must be topolino.”

The first time I saw this in class I was beyond boredom. I could not comprehend what I had gotten myself into. I would have to spend a semester detailing in the same fashion very complex systems in the most expansive formal way to preclude any unexpected scenarios from happening and to ensure that the system behaves **exactly** as we want it to. Sigh.

But with such rigorousness come advantages. Things are deconstructed to their essence. The designer is thus forced to describe with precision not only what (s)he wants but also what (s)he wants to avoid, which is super important – imagine medical applications -. Using any program without having conducted formal specification is analogous to living in a building which was built without a structural engineer first describing the structure of the building. Would you live in that building?

But besides ensuring robustness, formal specification comes with another benefit, with broader applications. Specification forces one to be precise in their speech. And in product management where I have spent my career*, speech is a very important tool. See an engineer’s job is not to guess what the PM thinks or what common sense would dictate. That is most definitely not the job of the user either. So, when you write a user story along the lines of “As a user X, I want to do Y so that Z” you are writing a similar phrase with the one in the example. And when you proceed in defining acceptance criteria given a user is in state A, when user does even B, then C- you are really writing the formal specification. Being trained in the formal notation is training your mind in set theory, in being able to ensure what events belong in the sphere of possibility and which ones do not. This is the skill that guarantees non-buggy products and happy users.

And of course, this extends beyond product. In life, in relationships, in negotiations and most importantly within one’s mind. Being precise when structuring one’s thinking is the single most important optimization that I can see. It’s impact spans from from increasing happiness (be clear what you want, what you fear etc) to achieving and enjoying success (first be precise what success is and what is not – then you can have a fulfilling result).

So, software engineering. Take that course. It’s not about programs, it’s about precise with your words.

* I see entrepreneurship as product management with a couple of differences. Higher degree of autonomy and more admin.